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Abstract—With the all IP based Next Generation Networks
being deployed around the world, the use of real-time multimedia
service applications is being extended from normal daily commu-
nications to emergency situations. However, currently different
emergency providers utilise differing networks and different
technologies. As such, conversations could be terminated at the
setup phase or data could be transmitted in plaintext should
incompatibility issues exit between terminals. To this end, a
novel security gateway that can provide the necessary security
support for incompatible terminals was proposed, developed and
implemented to ensure the successful establishment of secure
real-time multimedia conversations. A series of experiments were
conducted to evaluate the security gateway through the use
40 Boghe softphone acting as the terminals. The experimental
results demonstrate that the best performance of the prototype
was achieved by utilising a multithreading and multi-buffering
technique, with an average of 582 microseconds processing
overhead. Based upon the ITU-Ts 150 milliseconds one way delay
recommendation for voice communications, it is envisaged that
such a marginal overhead will not be noticed by users in practice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Real-time multimedia services, such as voice over IP and
image transmitting, have become indispensable applications
for the Next Generation Network (NGN), providing an eco-
nomical and important all IP based communication channel
for the modern society [1]. Real-time multimedia services can
be utilised not only for daily communications (e.g. calling
friends and family, video conferencing with business partners)
but also in emergency situations (e.g. transmitting images of
a car accident to first responders) [2-4]; therefore, private
and sensitive information would be inevitably be transmitted
in various conversations. Furthermore, real-time multimedia
services can be established from terminals within the NGN and
also across domains with other communication networks (e.g.
Private Mobile Radio (PMR) and Public Switched Telephone
Network (PSTN)) [5, 6]; consequently, certain incompatibility
issues could be developed when users from different networks
try to communicate with each other.
Within the NGN environment, the Session Initiation Pro-
tocol (SIP) is the predominant choice for setting real-time
conversations in the signalling plane and Real-time Transfer
Protocol (RTP) or Secure RTP (SRTP) are the de facto
standards for transmitting the conversation in the form of
IP packets in the media plane [7-9]. Nonetheless, various
media codecs (e.g. GSM, PCM) and security controls (e.g.
AES CM 128 HMAC SHA1 80, AES CM 192 HMAC S
HA1 32) can be utilised by terminals to encode/decode and
protect real-time media contents respectively. A conversation
could be terminated prematurely should the calling parties use
different codecs and/or security controls, even if they were in
life threatening situations and intended to utilise real-time mul-
timedia services to communicate with emergency responders;
or the conversation could be established but without proper
security protections, leaving the information transmitted in
plaintext.
With the aim of overcoming the issue caused by mis-
matched codecs and/or security controls, gateways should be
implemented to bridge the communication between incompat-
ible terminals either within the NGN or from other networks.
Since the late 1990s, a number of media gateways that provide
transcoding support (i.e. convert one codec to another) have
already been defined and developed for both research and
commercial purposes, including [10-14]. In comparison, little
work has been carried out on solving the problem posed
by incompatible security controls (i.e. the confidentiality and
integrity of the information will not be protected). Therefore,
this paper will present a working prototype of the Technology
Independent Security Gateway (TI-SGW) that is designed to
fulfil the purpose of cross-ciphering (i.e. transform one security
control to another) for incompatible terminals [15]. The paper
will focus upon presenting an evaluation of the gateways
performance characteristics.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 2
presents related work in the domain of security controls for
real-time multimedia services; section 3 illustrates the security
gateway architecture and its function. The prototype of the
gateway, its performance characteristics and the impact of
these performance characteristics will be discussed in section
4, 5 and 6 respectively; and the conclusion and future work
will be presented in section 7.
II. SECURITY CONTROLS FOR REAL-TIME
MULTIMEDIA COMMUNICATIONS
It is well documented that SRTP is the fundamental pro-
tocol for securing the real-time multimedia communication on
TABLE I. A LIST OF CRYPTO SUITES OF THE SRTP
Crypto Suites
AES CM 128 HMAC SHA1 80
AES CM 128 HMAC SHA1 32
AES F8 128 HMAC SHA1 80
AES 192 CM HMAC SHA1 80
AES 192 CM HMAC SHA1 32
AES 256 CM HMAC SHA1 80
AES 256 CM HMAC SHA1 32
the NGN; and that SRTP relies upon the combination of crypto
suites and key exchange methods to ensure the confidentiality
and integrity of multimedia traffic. In this section, existing
crypto suites and key exchange methods for securing the real-
time multimedia communications will be examined.
A. Crypto suites of the SRTP
A crypto suite is a mixture of encryption and Message
Authentication Code (MAC) algorithms that offer confiden-
tiality, integrity and authentication for a piece of information.
The default encryption algorithm of the SRTP is Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) that can operate in two modes
(i.e. Segmented Integer Counter Mode AES (i.e. AES CM)
and AES in f8 mode) and three key sizes (i.e. 128, 192 and
256); and the standard message authentication and integrity
algorithm of the SRTP is HMAC-SHA1 that can utilise two
key sizes (i.e. 32 and 80) [7]. Based upon the combination of
the encryption, message authentication and integrity algorithms
and various key sizes, a set of crypto suites can be obtained
for the SRTP (as presented in table 1) [16, 17].
B. Key exchange protocols for the SRTP
A key exchange protocol is the method by which crypto-
graphic keys are exchanged between users, permitting crypto-
graphic algorithms to be utilised. A number of key exchange
protocols have been proposed to incorporate with the SRTP,
constituting the security key exchange process between various
terminals. In general, a key exchange protocol can utilise
one of the three ways to manage the security key: through
a Key Management Server (KMS), via the signalling plane
and through the media plane.
Two key exchange protocols utilise the KMS approach
to manage their key information: MIKEY pre-shared key
and MIKEY-public key encryption [18, 19]. In both cases,
a KMS is required for distributing security key material to
terminals. Initially, individual terminals authenticate with the
KMS to obtain their security key material (e.g. a pre-shared
key or a private key) which is then utilised for securing the
media transmission once the call set up phase is completed
in the signalling plane; also the security key transmission
process between individual terminals and the KMS should be
protected by additional methods (e.g. a digital signature or a
bootstrapping server function) [18, 20].
Three key exchange protocols rely upon the signalling
plane to perform the key exchange process: Session Descrip-
tion Protocol (SDP) Security Descriptions for Media Streams
Fig. 1. The TI-SGW Architecture
(SDES), IMS Authentication and Key Agreement and Otway-
Rees based key management [16, 20]. In this way, the key
material is exchanged between terminals during the call setup
SDP negotiation process in the signalling plane. Therefore,
these protocols can only be utilised when the signalling plane
is protected; otherwise, the confidentiality and integrity of the
key material could be compromised.
ZRTP is a media plane key management protocol that
utilises the Diffie-Hellman key exchange method to establish
security key materials between terminals [21]. Terminals start
to discover whether their peers also support the ZRTP once
they obtain their IP addresses during the call set up phase;
the media communication will be protected by ZRTP if all
terminals in the conversation are compatible with the protocol.
It is not the authors intention to compare the advantages
and disadvantage of the aforementioned crypto suites and key
exchange protocols for the SRTP, but merely to present the
variety of security controls which could be utilised for securing
real-time multimedia services within the NGN environment.
As mentioned in the introduction, a real-time multimedia
session will not be established or protected if terminals utilise
different security controls. Therefore, a security gateway that
can ensure the confidentiality, integrity and authentication
of a real-time multimedia session of security incompatible
terminals is required. Such a security gateway will be described
in the next section.
III. A TECHNOLOGY INDEPENDENT SECURITY
GATEWAY
With the purpose of providing security support for any
incompatible terminals to establish real-time multimedia com-
munications, a novel technology independent Security Gate-
way was previously proposed by the authors [15].
As illustrated in Figure 1, the proposed security gateway
architecture contains a number of internal modules, which en-
able the gateway to provide secure and timely security support.
Based upon the nature of each internal module, they can be
categorised into three levels: the signalling, media and manage-
ment components. The signalling plane components are mainly
responsible for negotiating with the signalling plane regarding
Fig. 2. A high-level information flow within the TI-SGW
various parameters for the establishment and management of
a conversation. The media components are in charge of setting
up appropriate media communication channels based upon the
information negotiated in the signalling plane for incompatible
terminals. The management controller controls the components
from both the signalling and media planes; it also provides
additional functionalities, such as resource management, error
control and performance monitoring.
When a real-time multimedia session involving incom-
patible terminals occurs, the presence of the TI-SGW will
be required. A high-level of information flow between the
signalling plane and the TI-SGW and how the information
is utilised by the gateway is illustrated in figure 2. When
the signalling sends a SIP message to the TI-SGW, the
Signalling Controller checks the type of the message and
responds accordingly. If it is an invite message, the Signalling
Controller replies with a 200OK message that contains the
security capabilities (e.g. AES CM 128 HMAC SHA1 80
and security key information) and connection information (e.g.
IP address and port number) of the gateway; in the meantime,
the 200OK message will be forwarded to the Management
Controller which utilises the information to create media thread
for the Media Controller. Based upon the information provided
by the Management Controller, the Media Controller can build
up receivers and senders with appropriate security policies
for decrypting incoming SRTP traffic from one terminal (e.g.
caller) and encrypting outgoing traffic for the other terminal
(e.g. callee). If it is a BYE message, the Management Con-
troller utilises it to close related threads at the media level
accordingly.
Based upon the TI-SGW architecture and the information
flow logic, a prototype of the gateway is developed. Details of
the prototype are fully described in section 4.
IV. TI-SGW PROTOTYPE
A working prototype of the proposed security gateway
was developed based upon the architecture design presented
in Section 3. The prototype, designed specially to deal with
real-time multimedia traffic, is capable of providing security
support for incompatible terminals in a timely fashion. Accord-
ing to the design of the TI-SGW architecture, the prototype
was developed in Linux with three segments: the Security
Resource Function Controller was developed in Java, while the
Management Controller and the Security Resource Function
Processor were developed in C. The connection between the
Management Controller and the Security Resource Function
Controller was created via a socket to minimise any potential
communication delays.
The Security Resource Function Controller was developed
based upon an existing open source SIP stack implementations
(i.e. IMS-communicator) [22]. The Security Resource Function
Controller is able to register the gateway with the signalling
domain of the NGN through mutual authentication. Once
the registration process is completed, the Security Resource
Function Controller can be utilised to establish various call
setup processes with the signalling plane of the NGN via
different types of SIP messages stated in RFC 3261 [8].
As mentioned in the previous section, the Security Resource
Function Controller forwards the information of the call setup
to the Management Controller which will deal it accordingly
(e.g. create/terminate media connections).
The Management Controller and the Security Resource
Function Processor were developed based upon a number of C
open source libraries: Pthread, Socket, Semaphore and Libsrtp
[23]. Pthread was utilised by the Management Controller to
create thread for media receivers and senders; semaphore was
used by the Security Resource Function Processor to ensure the
access to the critical section is guaranteed, reducing potential
packet lost issue; libsrtp was capitalised by the Management
Controller to provide security capabilities to the security gate-
way with majority of crypto suites presented in Table 1; and
socket was utilised by Security Resource Function Processor
for the setup of media receivers and senders at the socket
level. In addition, a code snippet of how the Security Resource
Function Processor operates after the Management Controllers
create threads for media connection is illustrated in Figure 3.
It is envisaged that the Security Resource Function Con-
troller and the Management Controller will not take much
of the processing powering as the SIP is a lightweight text-
based protocol and management of the security gateway would
be performed occasionally with light activities (e.g. viewing
how many existing connections). In comparison, the Security
Resource Function Processor could require more resource
as it deals constantly with media connections in real-time.
Furthermore, a higher amount of processing power would be
demanded as the number of connections increases. In order
to explore the association between the number of threads and
buffers with the processing power and their impact upon the
Fig. 3. Logics for receiving and sending threads
real-time multimedia conversations, two versions of the send-
ing mechanism of the Security Resource Function Processor
were developed: a) Multi-thread Multi-buffer (MM) and b)
Single thread Single buffer (SS). MM provides a dedicated
thread and buffer for each sending thread while SS indicates
that only one thread and one buffer is created for the sending
function regardless the number of terminals. The receiving
function utilises the multi-thread approach (i.e. each receiving
port is a unique thread).
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
With the aim of evaluating the TI-SGW, a set of
experiments was conducted within a local private net-
work. The security gateway prototype was configured on
an Intel Pentium 4 computer (specification: Duo core
2.80GHZ processor and 2.9GB memory) with Ubuntu
12.04. Boghe was chosen as the terminal as it supports
two crypto suites (i.e. AES CM 128 HMAC SHA1 80 and
AES CM 128 HMAC SHA1 32) [24]. The Open IMS core
was utilised to simulate the signalling part of the NGN [25];
the Open IMS core handles user registration and call set up
processes. With the aim of obtaining meaningful experiment
outcomes, 40 Boghe terminals (i.e. 20 pairs) were utilised:
callers and callees were configured to use different crypto
suites but the same codec (i.e. Pulse Code Modulation (PCM));
the capability of the TI-SGW could not be thoroughly tested
if a lower number of terminals was chosen, e.g. 20 terminals;
nonetheless, experiment outputs could be inaccurate should
a higher number of terminals was picked, e.g. 60 terminals.
Lastly, SDES was chosen as the key exchange protocol be-
tween the Security gateway and terminals due to its simplicity.
In total, 6 sets of experiments were conducted by utilising
the combination of several parameters within the sending
function of the security gateway: the thread and buffer (i.e.
MM or SS), the waiting period before checking the buffer (i.e.
1 millisecond, 10 millisecond), and a random time between 1
and 10 millisecond. Also, several operational characteristics
were chosen to evaluate the TI-SGW: CPU usage, the overall
processing (i.e. the duration between a SRTP packet enters and
leaves the TI-SGW), and the decryption and encryption time
of a SRTP packet.
Figure 4 illustrates the CPU usage of the TI-SGW under
the 6 experiments. In general, a higher amount of processing
power is required as the number of terminal pairs increases.
The MM based approach requires more processing power than
the SS based method does for each additional pair. The waiting
period for checking the buffer has little effect on the SS
based methods in terms of the Security gateway CPU usage.
Fig. 4. TI-SGW CPU usage
TABLE II. THE AVERAGE PROCESSING TIME FOR OVERALL,
DECRYPTION AND ENCRYPTION PER SRTP PACKET IN
MICROSECOND
MM1-10 MM1 M10 SS1-10 SS1 SS10
Overall 3,566 581.5 5,067 3,758 949 6,349
Decryption 20.4 22.2 19.9 15.2 16.3 15.1
Encryption 12.7 13.1 12 10.7 11 10.6
In comparison, the same parameter has a stronger influence
on the Security gateway CPU usage when the MM based
approach was utilised. For example, when 20 pairs of terminal
were connected to the Security gateway, its CPU usage were
60% and 32% for the waiting period of 1 millisecond and 10
milliseconds respectively.
Figure 5 presents the outcome of the cumulative distribu-
tion function on the overall processing time of the Security
gateway for SRTP packets of the first pair of terminals in
various scenarios. In total, about 200,000 SRTP packets were
processed for the first pair of terminals, representing a 25-
minute conversation (i.e. from the starting to the ending time
of each experiment). As shown in the figure, both MM and SS
approaches have less influence on the overall SRTP processing
time than the waiting periods do. When the waiting period
was chosen for 1 millisecond, 80% of the SRTP packets
were processed within 1 millisecond frame. In comparison,
the Security gateway had to take 8-10 milliseconds to process
80% of the SRTP packets when the 10 milliseconds waiting
period were chosen.
Figure 6 and 7 show the decryption and encryption pro-
cessing time for the SRTP packets of the first pair of terminals
from all 6 experiments. In general, the security gateway spends
between 10-30 microseconds to decrypt 90% of the SRTP
packets in all scenarios; while the encryption process only
takes around 10-20 microseconds for the same amount of
SRTP packets [26, 27].
The average processing time on a SRTP packet during the
overall, decryption and encryption processes in all experiments
Fig. 5. The overall processing time for SRTP packets of the first pair of
terminals
Fig. 6. Decryption processing time for SRTP packets of the first pair of
terminals
is summarised in Table 2. In general, the MM approach with 1
millisecond waiting period achieved the best overall processing
time of 581.5 microseconds. In comparison, it takes the SS
approach with a 10 milliseconds waiting period around 6
milliseconds; interestingly the same approach achieved the best
performance on average decryption and encryption time with
15.1 and 10.6 microseconds respectively.
VI. DISCUSSION
Based upon the presented experiment outcomes, it demon-
strates that the security gateway prototype is capable of provid-
ing support for incompatible terminals for the NGN platform.
Generally, the multi-threading multi buffer based approach
provides better performance than the single threading buffer
based technique does in terms of overall delay introduced by
the security gateway (as demonstrated in Table 2). This is
Fig. 7. Encryption processing time for SRTP packets of the first pair of
terminal
expected as the MM approach provides dedicated threads for
each pair of terminals while all the terminals have to share the
single processing resource in the SS technique. Nonetheless,
the shortcoming of the former approach is that it requires more
CPU resources for supporting the same number of terminal
pairs than its counterpart does as the additional threads were
created (as demonstrated in Figure 4).
The waiting periods were chosen based upon previous
empirical studies. The CPU of the security gateway would
be taken over by the checking process should a shorter period
of time was chosen (e.g. 20 microseconds); while a degraded
quality would be experienced by users if a longer period of
time was allocated (e.g. 100 milliseconds). This phenomenon
is also reflected by results presented in Figure 4. Nonethe-
less, based upon the ITU-Ts one way delay less than 150
millisecond recommendation on voice communications [28],
it demonstrates that the overall delay that is introduced by the
TI-SGW could be ignored as the overall processing time is
less than 10 milliseconds for most of the scenarios (apart the
result from SS1-10).
From the results presented by Figure 6, 7 and Table 2, they
demonstrate that the decryption and encryption time on SRTP
packets are significantly smaller than the overall processing
time. Hence, more investigation should be carried on the topic
of reducing the overall delay time but without compromising
the processing powers. Furthermore, the decryption and en-
cryption time on the SRTP packet should be the same in theory
as the symmetric encryption method was utilised. However,
the results show that the security gateway took more time on
the decryption process than the encryption process. This could
be caused by the implementation of the libsrtp library (e.g.
the number of machine cycles for both processes could be
different).
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper has identified the need for a security gateway
that can provide ciphering support for incompatible real-time
multimedia terminals for the NGN. Also based upon the
security gateway architecture, a working prototype that is fit
the purpose has been developed.
Based upon the experiment outputs, the results demonstrate
that a gateway can provide security support for incompatible
terminals. It is envisaged that the overhead introduced by the
TI-SGW (less than 10 milliseconds) would have little impact
on the real-time multi-media conversations based upon the
ITU-T’s 150 milliseconds one way delay recommendation on
one way voice communication. To this end, future research will
be focused upon two directions: reducing the overhead caused
by the TI-SGW and obtaining real users opinion upon the TI-
SGW and getting a measure for the Quality of Experience.
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